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DISTINGUISHED, FOLLOWED, AND OVERRULED
NORTH CAROLINA RECONSIDERS ENTIRETIES
BY PARTITION DEED
In 16 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 92 (1959), there appears a comment on
the North Carolina case of Smith v. Smith,1 in which the following
facts are pertinent:
Minnie Smith and her son, John Smith, were tenants in common
of a tract of land. John Smith married, and less than two months there-
after the following deeds were executed and recorded as one simul-
taneous transaction: one from John Smith to his mother,2 conveying
the entire tract in fee; the other from his mother to John and his
wife, the latter deed conveying only a part of the tract and reciting
that it created a tenancy by the entirety. Subsequently Smith and his
wife became divorced, and she, having remarried, brought an action
to partition the land. She contended that her status as tenant by the
entirety was changed by divorce to that of a tenant in common3 of
the property described in the deed from Minnie Smith, and that con-
sequently an action for partition would lie, she being entitled to her
rateable share.4 Having suffered an adverse ruling, she appealed. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the case on grounds not
pertinent to this comment,5 but upheld the trial court's ruling that
"if it should be determined [at a new trial that] the deeds are parti-
tion deeds, the petitioner would derive no title. 'Accordingly, a deed
made by one tenant in common to a cotenant and the latter's spouse
in partitioning inherited land or land held as a tenancy in common,
does not create an estate by the entirety or enlarge the marital rights
1248 N.C. 194, 1o2 S.E.2d 868 (1958).
-Smith's wife joined in the deed. In order to terminate the marital rights of
the grantor's spouse, the grantor customarily has his spouse join with him in the
conveyance. See 3 American Law of Property § 12.51 (Casner ed. 1952).
3Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N.E. 685 (1927); Fisher v.
Fisher, 217 N.C. 7o, 6 S.E.2d 812 (194o); Stewart v. Bleau's Estate, 1o2 Vt. 273,
147 A. 692 (1929).
"Tenancy in common is the estate on which partition is based. Smith v. Smith,
248 N.C. 194, 102 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1958).
1The case was remanded on two grounds: that the trial court erred in treating
the mutual deeds as partition deeds, there being insufficient evidence to indicate
such an intent by the parties; and that it erred also in holding that the suit was
prematurely brought by reason of an outstanding life estate in the grantor, Minnie
Smith. This life estate "shall not be a bar to a sale for partition of the remainder
or reversion thereof..1.." 02 S.E.2d at 872.
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of the spouse as previously fixed by law."' The court thus adopted
the doctrine that a partition deed which joins as grantee the spouse
of a cotenant cannot create an estate by the entirety, even though the
deed expressly purports to do so.
7
The case again came before the Supreme Court of North Carolina
a year later, and the court, in a unanimous decision, held that the
deed which joined the plaintiff wife as grantee did create a tenancy
by the entirety, and since this estate was destroyed by divorce, she
was enabled to maintain her partition suit as a tenant in common.8
The court, however, did not expressly repudiate its view that a parti-
tion deed cannot create an estate by entireties when a cotenant's
spouse is joined as grantee. Instead, it ruled that the evidence was
insufficient to show that the mutual deeds were partition deeds,9 and
went on to base its decision on the intent of the parties, as clearly mani-
fested by the deed's very words.10
The court seems to reach the right result here, as the manifest in-
tent of the parties should by no means be ignored. It also handily
avoids flying in the face of the overwhelming majority rule that a
partition deed cannot create an entireties estate by joining a coten-
ant's spouse." However, should the court hereafter be confronted
with a similar situation, but where the deeds are clearly partition
deeds, it will be faced with the choice of becoming a lonely minority
by ruling that a partition deed can create an estate by the entirety,
or of reaffirming the unjust result reached in the first Smith case.
JOSEPH L. LYLE, JR.
Old. at 871.
"This idea is in accord with the great weight of authority. E.g., Jelly v. Lamar,
242 Mo. 44, 145 S.W. 799 (1912); Snyder v. Elliott, 171 Mo. 362, 71 S.W. 826 (19o3);
Whitsett v. Wamack, 159 Mo. 14, 59 S.W. 961 (10oo); Shull v. Cummings, 174 Mo.
App. 569, 161 S.W. 360 (1913); Wood v. Wilder, 222 N.C. 622, 24 S.E.2d 474 (1943);
Speas v. Woodhouse, 162 N.C. 66, 77 S.E. iooo (1913); Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149
N.C. 223, 62 S.E. 910 (1908); Harrington v. Rawls, 131 N.C. 39, 42 S.E. 461 (1902);
Harrison v. Ray, lo8 N.C. 215, 12 S.E. 993 (1891); Rhodes v. Peery, 142 Ore. 65,
19 P.2d 418 (1933); Holt v. Holt, 185 Tenn. 1, 202 S.W.2d 650 (1947); Cottrell v.
Griffits, io8 Tenn. 191, 65 S.W. 397 (19o); Foster v. Foster, 153 Va. 636, 151 S.E.
157 (1930); Yancey v. Radford, 86 Va. 638, 1o S.E. 972 (189o).
$Smith v. Smith, o7 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1959).
9"The deeds are silent with reference to any partition of land; there is no in-
dication of the relative values of the tract conveyed and the tract retained by
Minnie M. Smith." 1o7 S.E.2d at 537.
"The criterion, says the court, is "the intention of the parties as disclosed by
their situations at the time, the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution
of the deeds and the facts to be drawn from the deeds themselves." 107 S.E.2d at 537.
"See note 7 supra.
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